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ABSTRACT 
A wide area network consisting of ballistic missile defense satellites and 
terrestrial nodes can be viewed as a hybrid, large-scale mobile wireless sensor network. 
Building on research in the areas of the wireless sensor networks (WSN) and the mobile 
ad hoc networks (MANET), this thesis proposes an efficient multistage security 
mechanism for node and data authentication and data confidentiality. Node authentication 
is provided by digital signatures and the public key infrastructure (PKI). The TESLA 
algorithm and IPSec are utilized for data authentication and confidentiality, respectively. 
Performance analysis and simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism 
meets the real-time data dissemination requirements of a ballistic missile defense system 
while maintaining throughput commensurate with unencrypted Internet Protocol (IP).  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is responsible for developing a ballistic 
missile defense system (BMDS) capable of protecting the U.S. homeland and its allies 
against inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) launched from anywhere in the world. 
To accomplish this objective, the BMDS mission requirements include surveillance, 
target detection, target tracking and discrimination, and kill assessment. These functions 
are performed by satellites at various orbits, mobile and fixed terrestrial platforms 
carrying IR and RF sensors, and ballistic missile interceptors for all stages of flight of the 
ICBM. 
All these sensors and platforms must be efficiently networked together, and target 
information should be transmitted back to a command and control center for decision 
making and weapon assignment purposes. This implies the need for real-time data 
exchange despite challenges presented by the hybrid, large-scale network. 
There are a number of security-related issues that should be addressed and solved 
prior to an early implementation of the system. These include node and data 
authentication as well as data confidentiality. Revealing any portion of the sensitive 
transmitted information to an untrusted party could degrade the accuracy and the 
reliability of the BMDS because target data could be deliberately altered or false data 
information could be inserted into the network.   
This thesis proposes a multistage security mechanism that provides node and data 
authentication as well as data confidentiality to protect the exchanging data from 
unauthorized viewing by applying encryption in the network layer. A two-stage node 
authentication is proposed based on digital signatures and public key infrastructure (PKI) 
because it uses certificate authorities for verification of the new node’s authentication 
credentials. Data authentication is accomplished through the timed efficient stream loss-
tolerant authentication (TESLA) protocol, which is in the process of becoming an IEEE 
standard. Finally, data confidentiality is provided by the IPSec set of protocols.  
 xvi
The performance of the proposed security mechanism is demonstrated using a 
Java crypto library and an OPNET simulation. A library of cryptographic functions, 
written in Java, measure the delays associated with the cryptographic algorithms that the 
proposed mechanism utilizes. Additionally, an OPNET simulation of the network is 
performed to evaluate the network’s throughput and delay performance when IPSec is 
applied. Performance analysis and simulation demonstrate that the proposed security 
scheme performs well when compared with unencrypted IP. Delay and throughput 
evaluation emphasize the expected trade-off between security and overhead and also 




The threat of a nuclear attack has been a challenge to the United States for over 
fifty years. As technology and access to it continue to evolve, weapons of mass 
destruction become efficient and more deadly while falling into the hands of an 
increasingly layer set of potential adversaries. Under the auspices of the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA), a system capable of providing protection against intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying multiple nuclear warheads has been under 
development for several years [27]. Such a system, identified as the ballistic missile 
defense system (BMDS) should be able to detect, track, and intercept ballistic missiles 
launched against the United States and its allies from any location in the world.  
An ICBM is a long-range ballistic missile designed for the delivery of nuclear 
weapon warheads. Its effective range exceeds 5,500 km or more, which allows it to be 
launched over oceanic distances. Platforms from which an ICBM could be launched vary 
from protected military silos to submarines and specially constructed mobile trucks. An 
ICBM follows three phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and terminal. The boost phase 
lasts from 3 to 5 minutes, and the missile reaches a speed of 7 km/sec. During this phase, 
the missile is constantly accelerating. When the ICBM reaches an altitude of 
approximately 1,200 km, the 25-30 minute midcourse phase begins. During midcourse, 
the missile is capable of deploying anti-detection decoys and countermeasures. As the 
ICBM reaches its target at an altitude of 100 km, the terminal phase of its trajectory 
begins [27]. 
One functional requirement of the BMDS is the capability to intercept an ICBM 
in all phases of flight. Although midcourse offers several advantages including ample 
time for detection, weapon assignment and interception, the ability of the ICBM to 
deploy its countermeasures as well as the possibility of collateral damage or nuclear 
detonation over friendly territory make this phase challenging. Terminal phase tends to 
be viewed as a “last choice,” so much work is now focused on the boost phase. The 
relatively small duration of the boost phase necessitates early detection; therefore, sensors 
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and interceptors must be deployed in the vicinity of the launching area. Furthermore, the 
reaction time is minimal and target data have to be transmitted back to the decision maker 
almost instantly. The significant advantage is that detection during this phase can be 
accomplished by IR sensors because the ICBM’s thermal signature is high due to the 
plumes produced by its acceleration.  
A number of security challenges face any underlying network designed to support 
a boost phase solution. The target information must be transmitted from the sensors to a 
command and control center for threat assessment and potential weapon assignment. A 
complete security solution must provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication for 
both the data and the communicating entities. 
These problems are further complicated by the wireless nature of the transmission 
medium. In addition to simple eavesdropping, the lack of physical boundaries allows an 
adversary to intercept and inject rogue data with relatively little effort. An authentication 
mechanism to validate the credentials revealed by the incoming network nodes as well as 
an intrusion detection mechanism to identify and restrict access to rogue nodes must be 
applied. The requirement to deploy sensors near the launching platform further increases 
the probability of a compromised node attempting to participate in the network.      
A. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to propose a multistage security scheme for hybrid 
large-scale wireless sensor networks for missile defense. The wireless nature of this 
large-scale network makes security challenging. The lack of physical boundaries 
complicates the requirements to confirm the authenticity of the communicating nodes, 
ensure that data from a valid source were not altered during transit and to protect the data 
from unauthorized viewing. The proposed multistage scheme consists of three separate 
security mechanisms designed to provide node authentication, data authentication, and 
data confidentiality. Analysis and simulation are included to demonstrate the delay and 
throughput performance of the proposed scheme. 
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B. RELATED WORK 
The proposed security mechanism builds on research conducted for traditional 
wireless sensor networks (WSN) and mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) and applies it to 
a hybrid, large-scale network for missile defense.  Unlike WSN and MANET 
applications, though, the nodes of this network are interconnected across large 
propagation distances and are not constrained by limited computational power, lack of 
memory, or energy limitations.  
A number of distributed public key management schemes to achieve node 
authentication for mobile ad-hoc networks have been proposed. Zhou et al. [34] propose 
a public key infrastructure (PKI) system in which the certificate authority (CA) private 
key is shared among nodes that have to cooperate in order to reveal the key. MOCA, 
proposed in [31] and [32], is an extension to [34] in which the CA is distributed not to the 
entire set of the nodes but only to those that exhibit physical security and adequacy in 
computational resources. J. Kong et al. [11] distributes portions of the CA’s key among 
different nodes. Our proposed scheme for digital signatures is based on a PKI 
infrastructure using strong encryption keys (1024 or 2048 bits in length) of the Rivest-
Shamir-Adelman (RSA) algorithm [20], which produces asymmetric keys used for 
encryption and decryption. 
Unlike those designed for node authentication, data authentication protocols used 
for real-time data exchange must have small authentication delays. BiBa [16] and HORS 
[19] are one-time signature authentication schemes using one-way functions. Chang et al. 
[22] solve the problem of storing many hash function operations in these schemes. The 
TESLA protocol [17], [15] provides efficient broadcast authentication by using one-way 
key chains and time slots as asymmetric primitives and is in the process of being 
standardized in the IETF Multicast Security (MSEC) working group [12]. It minimizes 
the authentication overhead, exhibits robustness in the face of packet losses, and can 
support links with different propagation delays. The µTESLA protocol [18] is the 
“micro” version of TESLA, designed specifically for wireless sensor networks. 
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C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the hybrid, large-scale 
network designed to support the ballistic missile defense system. The network real-time 
data dissemination requirements and link characteristics as well as the desired properties 
of the IR and the RF sensors are discussed. Security issues are addressed and the 
necessity of providing a multistage security mechanism for node and data authentication 
and data confidentiality is explained. A brief description of basic security primitives and 
protocols is given. Chapter III introduces the proposed multistage security mechanism, 
and Chapter IV examines the delay and throughput performance of the proposed 
algorithm through analysis and simulation. Chapter V provides conclusions of this thesis 
as well as recommendations for future work. 
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II. HYBRID, LARGE-SCALE, WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK 
FOR MISSILE DEFENSE 
This chapter examines the network architecture, sensor characteristics, and 
security considerations. The observations in this chapter will be used to design the 
proposed security solution of the large-scale wireless sensor networks for missile defense.  
A. THE NETWORK 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has provided guidelines on network 
structure and functionalities for the Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense system (IBMDS) 
[13]. Building on these requirements, we envision a network architecture that relies on 
reliable, efficient, real-time cooperation between the nodes to provide a layered defense 
against a wide range of ballistic threats. This section addresses the topology, coverage, 
link characteristics, and security considerations of such a network. 
1. Network Architecture and Topology 
A ballistic missile defense system’s mission is to detect, track, and destroy one or 
multiple ballistic missiles launched from any platform and location in the world. A 
wireless wide-area network comprised of ballistic missile defense sensor platforms 
providing global coverage must be designed to support this challenging mission. Mission-
related functions for this type of network include early warning/detection, real-time target 
tracking, and secure target data transfer to a command and control center for decision 
making and weapon assignment.  
The proposed hybrid, large-scale network consists of satellite and terrestrial nodes 
in a 3-tier hierarchical structure positioned to provide global coverage. At the higher tiers, 
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites with search and 
track IR sensors are deployed, providing wider fields-of-view and redundancy in the 
network. Lower tier terrestrial platforms are mobile or fixed RF and IR sensors, such as 
land-based stations, warships, forward deployment radars (FDR), aircraft, and unmanned 
air vehicles (UAV). 
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Ballistic missiles follow a trajectory that consists of three phases: boost, 
midcourse, and terminal. Although the system should provide protection in all phases of 
flight, the focus of this work is based on missile engagement during its boost phase. In 
this phase, the missile countermeasures would not yet be deployed, the low altitude 
provides a wider selection of weapons, and the likelihood of friendly, collateral damage 
would be minimized. Accordingly, nodes of our network capable of detecting launches, 
tracking missile trajectories, and intercepting ballistic targets will be deployed and 
distributed as close as possible to the enemy’s boundaries. Table 1 presents the evolving 
IBMDS sensors and weapons inventory. 
 
 2005 2006 2007 
WEAPONS    
Ground-Based Interceptors  
(Long-Range Threat, Midcourse Defense) 10 14 24 
Patriot Advanced Capability-3  
(Short & Medium Range Threat, Terminal 
Defense) 
325 413 549 
Standard Missile-3 Sea-Based Interceptors 
(Short-to-Intermediate-Range Threat, 
Midcourse Defense 
9 14 21 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 2 Cruisers 3 Destroyers 2 Cruisers 
7 Destroyers 
3 Cruisers 
SENSORS (except Existing Defense 
Support Program Satellites)    
Upgraded Existing Early Warning Radars 2 3 3 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Ships 
(Long Range Surveillance and Track Only) 10 Destroyers 10 Destroyers 7 Destroyers 
Sea-Based X-Band Radar  1 1 
AN/TPY-2  1 2 
  
Table 1.   IBMDS platforms and sensors inventory (After Ref. [13]) 
 
An example of a hybrid, large-scale wireless sensor network for missile defense 
has been proposed by [8] and is shown in Figure 1. Here, the network is comprised of 
GEOs, LEOs, and terrestrial stations. When a potential target of interest (TOI) is 
detected, sensor nodes form an Area of Interest (AOI) based on predefined criteria, such 
as range to the TOI and whether the TOI is inbound or outbound.  The AOI is a clustering 
mechanism designed to facilitate data aggregation and data-centric routing within the 
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network. As the target moves through the sensors field, nodes make local (distributed) 




Figure 1.   Hybrid, Large-Scale Wireless Sensor Network for ballistic missile defense 
(From Ref. [9]) 
 
2. Network Design Requirements and Constraints 
In the following sections, the real-time data dissemination requirements generated 
by the missile defense application and the constraints of the satellite links are examined. 
The type of data, the manner in which the data are disseminated, and the underlying link 
characteristics play an important role in optimizing an appropriate security mechanism. 
For example, data broadcast requires a security mechanism that scales well for large 
numbers of recipients. Additionally, such a mechanism should be robust in the face of 
packet losses if applied to a link with high bit error rates (BER).  
a. Real-Time Data Dissemination Requirements 
Target tracking with the intent of missile engagement in the boost phase 
imposes stringent real-time delay requirements on the underlying communications 
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network. By real-time, we mean that there exist defined maximum bounds on the end-to-
end latency of the data transmissions. This requirement can be best illustrated by 
examining the flow of events that must occur during the 3-4 minute boost phase. Upon 
target detection, target data are broadcast to all the nodes in the network. Nodes inside the 
AOI pick up the tracking function and route target data through an aggregator back to the 
command and control center.  The command and control center processes the data and 
assigns an order to the weapon platform to be used for the target engagement. These data 
continue until the missile is intercepted. Considering the large propagation times 
associated with the satellite network links, it is critical to avoid processing, routing or 
security mechanisms that substantially increase the total delay. 
b. Satellite Link Characteristics 
The topology proposed for the hybrid, large-scale network is comprised of 
both terrestrial and satellite links. Terrestrial links have been well-studied in the wireless 
network literature (e.g., IEEE 802.16 standard). Accordingly, this section focuses on the 
satellite links and their delay, throughput and BER characteristics. 
Many communications satellites are located in the Geostationary Orbit 
(GEO) at an altitude of 35,863 km. Although, three satellites are necessary to achieve 
global coverage, four are typically used to provide sufficient overlaps. At this altitude, the 
orbit period is the same as the Earth's rotation period, and the satellite remains fixed over 
a point on the Earth’s surface. Therefore, each ground station is always able to “see” the 
orbiting satellite at the same position in the sky. The propagation time for a radio signal 










where s is the satellite altitude and c the speed of light. In communication applications 
where satellites act as relays for terrestrial nodes, delays are characterized by round trip  
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propagation times and increase by a factor of two. Furthermore, the satellite propagation 
delay will be even longer if the link includes multiple hops or if inter-satellite links are 
used.   
The lower orbits associated with LEO satellites require the use of more 
satellites for constant global coverage. To achieve global coverage, a constellation of at 
least 16 LEO satellites is required. Typically, twenty satellites are used to provide a 
sufficient overlap. LEO satellites are usually located at in an altitude band of 500–1500 
km. The propagation delay to a LEO orbit ranges from several milliseconds when 
communicating with a satellite directly overhead to as much as 80 ms when the satellite 
is on the horizon. Table 2 summarizes the propagation delays for the different satellite 








GEO-GEO 66,352 0.22 
GEO-LEO 34,863 0.116 
LEO-LEO 2,318 0.008 
Terrestrial-GEO 35,863 0.12 
Terrestrial-LEO 1,000 0.003 
 
Table 2.   Nominal propagation times for missile defense network links 
 
A network that consists of both satellite and terrestrial nodes implies the 
need for both terrestrial-to-satellite and satellite-to-satellite links. Particular emphasis and 
attention should be given to the satellite-to-satellite propagation times because the missile 
defense network utilizes interconnected satellite nodes that do not simply act as 
communication relays between space and earth stations but are an internal part of a larger 
network. 
Satellite communication channels are dominated by two fundamental 
characteristics: large noise levels and limited bandwidth. The strength of a radio signal 
falls off as a square of the distance traveled.  For a satellite link, the large distance results 
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in a low signal-to-noise ratio. Additionally, some frequencies are particularly sensitive to 
atmospheric effects, such as rain attenuation.  Satellite channels are especially susceptible 
to multi-path distortion. Typical bit error rates (BER) for a satellite link today are on the 
order of 10-7 or less [1].  
Satellite systems are typically bandwidth-limited, which makes it difficult 
to trade bandwidth to solve other design problems. In most applications, an asymmetric 
approach is used, and the downlink channel is provided a greater capacity than the uplink 
channel. This is because the downlinks are normally intended for broadcasting when the 
satellites are used as communication relays.  
In the context of the wireless network, these satellite link characteristics 
tend to degrade the performance of acknowledgement-based transport protocols, such as 
the transmission control protocol (TCP). Due to the large propagation delay of the 
satellite links, it will take a long time for a TCP sender to determine whether or not a 
packet has been successfully received at the final destination. Furthermore, TCP has no 
mechanism to determine whether a packet loss is due to congestion or bit errors. It is 
primarily designed for links with small BERs, so it assumes packet losses are due to 
congestion in the network and dramatically reduces the offered load. Thus, the congestion 
and flow control algorithms incorporated in TCP prevent it from fully utilizing the 
satellite link, resulting in relatively poor performance [33]. 
Performing Enhancing Proxies (PEP) is one of the solutions designed to 
overcome the TCP performance degradation across satellite links [26]. PEP are deployed 
between the two communicating entities and use techniques, such as acknowledgement 
handling, speeding up the TCP slow start mechanism, and increasing the congestion 
window. PEP improves the congestion of the low speed uplink by delaying the 
transmission of acknowledgments of TCP segments that arrive in bursts or reconstructing 
acknowledgments if they are lost. PEP can also be used for retransmission of TCP 
segments when duplicate acknowledgements are received. This function requires 
additional buffering capabilities. Another useful function is tunneling in which messages 
are forced to follow a specific path. When coupled with compression capabilities, PEP 
can also be used to reduce the amount of data that are inserted into the network [26]. 
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Research is currently being conducted to combine PEP with an end-to-end 
security mechanism, such as IPSec. The problem associated with this implementation is 
that IPSec encrypts and/or authenticates the fields that the TCP PEP needs to be able to 
access. These include source and destination IP addresses as well as port and sequence 
numbers. A number of solutions, such as utilizing upper layer security mechanisms 
(SSL/TLS) instead of IPSec [2], placing the PEP before the IPSec protocol, coping 
hashed TCP flow control parameters in the new IP header [30] and encrypting different 
fields of the IP packet using different keys have been proposed [5]. 
B. SENSORS 
Boost-phase intercept requires early launch detection and rapid, accurate tracking 
to launch and guide the interceptor. Although infrared or radar sensors can be used 
separately for initial detection and tracking, combining both approaches helps reduce the 
false alarm rate. Additionally, passive infrared sensors require triangulation from multiple 
sensors to obtain an accurate track because range information is not available [29]. For 
this purpose, forward deployable RF sensors could be used. Figure 2 illustrates these 
sensor options. Although detailed sensor architecture designs are quite complicated, their 
basic limitations and functionalities can be understood by examining the physics of each 
sensor type.  
 
Figure 2.   Sensor architecture schematic. Ground/Sea-Based and airborne RF sensors 
in combination with Satellite-Based IR sensors  (From Ref. [29]) 
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1. IR Sensors 
Passive infrared systems can detect missile plumes from a distance of thousands 
of kilometers and, hence, can detect ballistic missile launches globally from high-Earth or 
geosynchronous orbits. Space-based IR sensors are very convenient because of their 
capability to cover wide areas. Infrared detection and tracking ranges depend on the 
infrared signal emitted by the target, the diameter of the optics, and the minimal 
detectable signal of the focal plane array, which is a function of the noise in the sensor 
and signal clutter returns from other objects (e.g., clouds, rain) in the sensor’s field of 
view. Sensor noise is determined by the detector’s dark current, which is a sensitive 
function of its operating temperature. The precision with which an infrared sensor can 
determine the missile booster position is determined by the pixel dimensions of the focal 
plane array [3].  
The IR spectrum can be divided into four categories: (1) Short-Wave IR (SWIR) 
with wavelengths of 1-3 µm, (2) Medium-Wave IR (MWIR) with wavelengths of 3-5 µm, 
(3) Long-Wave IR (LWIR) with wavelengths of 8-12 µm and (4) Very Long-Wave IR 
(VLWIR) with wavelengths greater than 12 µm. Target emission obeys the blackbody 
radiation theory, initially derived by Plank in the early 1900s, in which the amount and 
wavelength (color) of the emitted radiation of a blackbody (ideal source of thermal 
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where M(λ,T) is exitance of the object, λ is the wavelength, h is the Plank’s constant, c the 
speed of light, T the temperature and K the Boltzmann’s constant. Figure 3 is a plot of the 
blackbody radiation for different temperatures. The main idea is that as the temperature 





Figure 3.   Blackbody radiation intensity for different temperatures (From Ref. [14]) 
 
a. IR Photo Detection 
For the BMDS, detection of the missile should be performed either in the 
endo-atmosphere or exo-atmosphere. There are two critical differences with respect to 
detection and tracking in these two cases. IR sensors used at lower altitudes below 
atmosphere level (endo-atmosphere) observe and discriminate warm targets with high 
background irradiance from scattered sunlight in the Earth’s surface. Exo-atmospheric IR 
sensors, on the other hand, engage targets that have cooler temperatures with low 
background irradiance levels because the space background has relatively much lower 
temperatures than the Earth’s surface [25]. 
As derived from the blackbody radiation theory, a higher temperature 
target has a radiation peak at smaller wavelengths while at lower temperatures, longer 
wavelength emissions are generated. Applying these principles to the BMDS, it becomes 
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clear that IR sensors with multicolor capabilities should be deployed. Surveillance, target 
detection, and target tracking could be performed using single color sensors if the target 
is easy to identify. If either the target or the background is uncertain or dynamic during 
the engagement process, a sensor with multicolor capability will improve the probability 
of successful interception. Multicolor operation is essential at the point where the ICBM 
shifts from one phase of flight to another. The boost phase background is significantly 
different from that in midcourse, and, more importantly, the midcourse thermal signature 
is also substantially different since no plumes exist and proper discrimination from 
decoys and debris might be necessary [24]. 
Considering missile defense in both tactical and national theaters, IR 
sensors with multi-spectral (e.g., MWIR, LWIR, and VLWIR) as well as multicolor 
operation should be deployed. The sensors should exhibit high efficiency and uniformity. 
Along these lines, technology advancements are very promising in the field of Quantum 
Well Infrared Photo-detectors (QWIP), which play an important role in the sensing IR 
discipline [24]. 
b. Quantum Well Infrared Photo Detectors (QWIP) 
The operation of conventional photo detectors is based on an inter-band 
transition of electrons across the band gap (Eg) between the valence and the conduction 
band as shown in Figure 4. Photons are used to excite the electrons resting in the valence 
band. Their energy (hv) must be sufficient to overcome the energy gap barrier; therefore,  
 
 > ghv E  (2.3) 
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Figure 4.   Band diagram of an intrinsic photo detector (From Ref. [7]) 
 
The photo-excited electrons can be collected to measure the produced 
photocurrent in a connected external circuit. This energy gap determines the spectral 
response of the photo detectors. Photosensitive materials have a defined energy gap, 
which constrains the photo detection to a single, limited band (one color photo detectors). 
Additionally, detection of VLWIR radiation up to 20 µm requires small band gaps down 
to 62 meV [7]. These low band gap materials are more difficult to grow and process than 
large band gap semiconductors, such as GaAs. Quantum Well Photo detectors (QWIP) 
offer the advantage of multiple band gaps and consequently expand the photo detector 
capability to multicolor. They are constructed by placing a thin narrow band gap material 
between wider layers of a wide band gap material. The idea of using QW structures to 
detect infrared radiation can be understood by examining the basic principles of quantum 
mechanics. The quantum well is equivalent to the well-known “particle in a box” problem 
in quantum mechanics, which can be solved by the time-independent Schrodinger 
equation. The solutions to this problem are the eigenvalues that describe energy levels 
inside the quantum well in which the particle is allowed to exist. The energy levels are 
primarily determined by the quantum well dimensions (height and width) [3]. Figure 5 








Figure 5.   Quantum Well structure (From Ref. [7]) 
 
The position of the energy levels is determined by the thickness of the 
narrow band material and the band offset between the two materials. The QW structures 
offer the substantial advantage of having multiple wavelength detection capability 
(including the VLWIR band) in one sensor since different energy gaps exist. A common 
combination of materials used for QWIP is GaAs and AlGaAs due to their nearly 
identical lattice constants. A disadvantage of QW is its slightly lower operating 
temperature compared to detectors based on bulk semiconductors [24]. 
2. RF Sensors 
Radars are a good means to provide accurate range measurements as well as 
efficient target tracking. Airborne radars, in particular, can provide early ballistic missile 
detection if the radar is approximately 400 km or less from the missile launch site 
because, at this range, an airborne radar flying at 12 km (40,000 ft) altitude has line of 















the radar horizon [29]. If they are deployed inside the high risk area, they can provide the 
triangulation needed for the IR sensors to generate target distance and can valuably 








Operating Frequency (GHz) 9.5 3.3 10 
Pulse repetition frequency (Hz) 45 17 30 
Total average power (kW) 120 100 120 
Antenna height (m) 2.0 3.85 2.0 
Antenna width (m 4.6 3.65 4.0 
Physical aperture (m2) 9.2 14.1 8.0 
Effective aperture (m2) 6.0 2.0 5.2 
Power aperture product (kWm2) 720 1,200 624 
Receiving gain (with weighting) 75,400 18,200 72,600 
Weighted azimuth beam width 
(deg) 
0.44 1.60 0.48 
Weighted elevation beam width 
(deg) 
1.01 1.52 0.96 
Azimuth scan sector (deg) 90 90 90 
Search solid angle (sr) 0.0278 0.0415 0.0264 
Beam solid angle (sr) 1.36×10-4 7.38×10-4 1.41×10-4 
Noise temperature (◦K) 500 500 650 
System and atmospheric losses 
(dB) 
19.5 18.4 19.2 
 
Table 3.   Typical radar parameters (After Ref. [29]) 
 
Table 3 lists some of the typical characteristics of surveillance and tracking radar 
sensors that MDA uses for the BMDS (see also Table 1).  In addition to the AEGIS 
Ballistic Missile Defense system (sea-based S-band radar) and the AN/TPY-2 (Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense ground-based X-band Radar), MDA’s plan for RF detection 
and tracking includes the new Sea-based X-band radar (SBX). SBX is a floating, self-
propelled radar, platform, capable of operating under heavy weather conditions and 
exhibiting robust discrimination capabilities. 
C. SECURITY 
The dynamic topology and wireless nature of the hybrid networks associated with 
strategic missile defense scenarios drive the requirement for a fail-safe node and data 
authentication scheme and robust data confidentiality mechanisms. As these scenarios 
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evolve in both time and space, new elements are often introduced into the existing 
network. The sensitivity and importance of the data being exchanged within the network 
often leaves no room for revealing all, or even part, of the information to an untrusted 
node. The primary requirement, therefore, becomes the effectiveness of the security 
mechanism in providing data encryption and node and data authentication, even at the 
price of longer delays. That being said, the real-time bounds still apply as there is clearly 
a limit on the useful lifetime of the sensed data. 
Data confidentiality can be achieved through encryption using symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Larger key lengths increase the strength of the 
algorithm but lead to longer decryption and encryption delays. 
Although minimizing network delays whenever possible is an important design 
objective, the initial node authentication scheme can tolerate increased latency. This is 
because prior to node authentication, new nodes are not active members of the network 
and do not share the same real-time data delivery requirements of nodes already in the 
network. In contrast, data authentication clearly requires a bounded minimum delay, 
particularly among nodes exchanging sensor data within the AOI for target tracking. 
Additionally, this target information must be aggregated and transmitted back to the 
command and control node in a timely fashion to meet stringent decision timelines and 
potential weapon assignment requirements. To guarantee authenticity of the transmitted 
data, the data must be verified that each packet originated from a valid (authenticated) 
source and that it was not altered during transit. Accordingly, the data authentication 
protocol should minimize end-to-end latency of the data packets and demonstrate 
robustness in the face of packet losses. Low per-packet overhead will also increase data 
throughput and minimize the authentication computation time. 
The security mechanism proposed in this thesis is designed to meet the 
requirements identified above. Although this thesis focuses specifically on authentication 
and confidentiality of the transmitted data, there are a number of other security challenges 
that must also be addressed in a complete security solution. Many of these can be adapted 
directly from existing work in both WSN and MANET research and include such issues 
as defending against denial of service (DoS) attacks, detecting misbehaving nodes, 
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avoiding eavesdropping of traffic, preventing  traffic analysis, and key management 
issues. This section provides a brief overview of the security primitives that will form the 
foundation of the proposed authentication and confidentiality schemes.  
1. Symmetric Ciphers 
Symmetric ciphers use the same secret key for both the encryption and the 
decryption processes. These processes consist of four components: 
• The original message.  
• The encryption/decryption algorithm that performs all the necessary 
transformations on the input message. 
• A secret key that is fed in as an input to the algorithm along with the 
original message. This key is responsible for scrambling the message 
during encryption or producing the original message during decryption. 
• The output of the process, known as the cipher text. 
Symmetric encryption depends on the secrecy of the key used for the encryption 
and not on the secrecy of the algorithm used. An attacker with prior knowledge of the 
algorithm and one or more cipher texts should not be able to extract the cipher key or, of 
course, read the original message. A number of symmetric ciphers have been proposed 
with various key lengths. The larger the key, the stronger the encryption is. Examples of 
symmetric ciphers include Digital Encryption Standard, DES (Federal Information 
Processing Standards, FIPS PUB 46-2), 3DES (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, NIST, Special PUB 800-67), Advanced Encryption Standard, AES (FIPS 
PUB 197) and Rivest Cipher, RC4. Primary differences among these schemes are the key 
length used (some support variable key lengths), the performance time, and the way in 
which they process the plain text. A stream cipher processes the original message as one 
continuous input whereas a block cipher first breaks the original message into blocks and 





a. Block Ciphers and Modes of Operation 
Most block ciphers break up messages into blocks of 64 bits and chain 
them together after the encryption or the decryption. Four common chaining mechanisms 
exist [21]: 
(1) Electronic Codebook (ECB).  This chaining mechanism 
encodes each block independently but uses the same key. Thus, the same plain text will 
always result in the same cipher text. It is generally not considered very secure because it 
is susceptible to pattern matching, a common technique used by crypto analysts. 
(2) Cipher Block Chaining (CBC).  In CBC, the current block 
is XORed with the previous block. An encrypted block of random data, called the 
initialization vector (IV), begins the chaining process and is XORed with the first 









(3) Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB).  Similar to the CBC. The 
only difference is that CBC uses the cipher text of the preceding block rather than the 
plain text. 
(4) Output Feedback (OFB).  A variation of the CFB mode in 
which the XORed block is randomly generated and is, therefore, independent of the 
preceding plain text. 
b. Stream Ciphers 
A stream cipher processes the input plaintext as a single message, 
producing the scrambled output in byte or even bit intervals as it executes. The key is fed 
as input into a pseudorandom byte generator, and the resulting key stream is XORed 
byte-wise with the plaintext, producing the desired encrypted output. Decryption is 
performed in the reverse order. Figure 7 presents the stream cipher operation. 
 
 






The primary advantage of stream ciphers over block ciphers is that they 
are faster and simpler to implement. The major disadvantage is that if the pseudorandom 
generator is poorly designed, it will eventually repeat itself and make the secret key 
subject to compromise. 
2. Public Key Cryptography and RSA 
In asymmetric encryption, two different but mathematically related key values are 
required: a public key and a private key. With these keys, if the plaintext is encrypted 
using the public key, it can only be decrypted using the private key (and vice versa). The 
private key is kept secret while the associated public key is readily available and publicly 
distributed hence the name “public key cryptography.” 
a. Principles of Public Key Cryptosystems 
To understand the advantages of the asymmetric system, consider two 
people who would like to communicate secretly over a public (and shared) medium. With 
the symmetric approach, these two people would have to share the same secret key. With 
the asymmetric approach, the sender encrypts the message with his private key and the 
recipient uses the associated sender’s public key to perform the decryption. The obvious 
advantage is that the sender does not have to transmit the key used for the encryption (in 
our case, his private key) to the receiver. This reduces the probability that a malicious 
third party can spoof the key and compromise the network message traffic.  
Applications that use public key cryptosystems can be broadly arranged 
into three categories [23]: 
(1) Encryption/Decryption.  The recipient’s public key is used 
by the sender for encryption. 
(2) Digital Signatures.  The sender uses his private key to 
digitally sign the original message. The recipient decrypts the message with the sender’s 
public key.  
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(3) Key Exchange.  A temporary key used for during a single 
session is distributed by encrypting it with the private key of either the sender or the 
receiver. 
Asymmetric algorithms are designed so that the key for encryption 
is different from the key for decryption. The decryption key cannot be calculated from 
the encryption key (not in any reasonable amount of time) and vice versa. The usual key 
size ranges from 512 to 2048 bits [21]. These algorithms are relatively slow compared to 
symmetric ones and their design is based on computational problems, such as factoring 
extremely large numbers or computing logarithms of extremely large numbers. Diffie-
Hellman [4], Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [FIPS 186], Rivest-Shamir-Adelman 
(RSA) [20], and Elliptic-Curve cryptography [10] are examples of asymmetric 
algorithms. In the next section, we will briefly discuss the RSA algorithm because part of 
our proposed node authentication scheme is based on this asymmetric algorithm. 
b. The RSA Algorithm 
Most of the asymmetric algorithms are based on modular arithmetic. 
According to [STALL06], “Modular arithmetic is a kind of integer arithmetic that 
reduces all numbers to one of a fixed set [0…n-1] for some number n. Any integer 
outside this range is reduced to one in this range by taking the remainder after division by 
n.” Analyzing modular arithmetic is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the definition 
will help the reader to understand the basic concepts behind the RSA algorithm. 
The RSA algorithm [20] was initially proposed in 1977. With the patent 
expiration in 2000, the algorithm has since become available to the public. Compared to 
similar algorithms, it is easier to understand and implement. It has undergone many years 
of extensive cryptanalysis. It is flexible and can accommodate variable key lengths 
(usually ranging from 512 to 2048 bits). RSA’s security mechanism is based on the 
difficulty of factoring very large numbers. RSA keys are generated as follows: 
(1) Select two large prime numbers p and q. 
(2) Compute: n p q= ×  
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(3) Chose an extremely large prime number e, with the constraint that e and 
(p-1)(q-1) are relatively prime. The public key is then the concatenation of 
e and n to form (e, n). 
(4) Calculate the private key d such that 
mod( -1) ( -1)e d p q× = ×  (1.3) 
-1 mod( -1) ( -1)d e p q= ×  (1.4) 
Upon calculation of d, the numbers p and q are no longer needed and can 
be discarded but must not be revealed. 
3. Message Authentication and Hash Functions 
Encryption provides a means to protect against eavesdropping and spoofing, but it 
is also necessary to ensure that the received message originated from a valid source and 
was not altered during transit. Additionally, any authentication method utilizing 
timestamps can also verify that the message has not been replayed or delayed longer than 
anticipated. The three most common message authentication schemes are: conventional 
encryption, hash functions, and message authentication codes (MAC) [23]. In the 
following sections, we will briefly discuss each of these three major authentication 
approaches. 
a. Conventional Encryption 
Conventional encryption is a relatively simple principle and is based on 
shared knowledge of a single secret key held by both the communicating entities. The 
sender encrypts the message using the secret key and transmits only the cipher text. The 
recipient decrypts the received cipher text, using the same secret key. Authentication is 
also achieved since the sender and receiver have knowledge of the key. It is critical that 
the secret key is not comprised. This method works well for point-to-point 
communication but requires a node to maintain a copy of the secret key for all potential 
communication partners. Key management problems arise when the communication is 
expanded to multiple nodes. Solutions to this multiple node problem have been proposed 
that use hash functions and message authentication codes [23]. 
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b. Hash Functions 
A hash function takes an input message of arbitrary length and produces a 
fixed-length output. The hash output is called the message digest. The hash algorithm is 
cryptographically secure if it demonstrates the following properties [23]: 
(1) The same input always produces the same output. 
(2) It should be computationally infeasible to find two messages that produce 
the same digest. 
(3) It should be computationally infeasible to produce the input message given 
the output (i.e., it is a one-way function). 
Hash functions provide data integrity and are commonly used to generate 
a fingerprint of a message or a file. Because a hash digest of a message is unique, it 
provides both integrity and authenticity. Hash digests of messages are usually appended 
to and transmitted with the original messages. The recipient receives both the message 
and the hash of the message. It computes the hash (the algorithm used is known) and 
compares the two hashes. If they match, it is assumed that the message has not been 
altered. 
Several hashing algorithms have been proposed in the literature. Examples 
include MD5 (RFC 1321), SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 (RFC 3174), and others. The 
primary difference among them is the output size. For example, MD5 produces a 128-bit 
output where SHA-256 produces a 256-bit output (as shown in Table 4). Notice, 
however, that if hash functions are not combined with any other authentication protocols, 
they guarantee the message’s integrity, but not the sender’s authenticity. 
 
 SHA-160 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 
Message digest 
size 160 256 384 512 
Message size Less than 264 Less than 264 Less than 2128 Less than 2128 
Block size 512 512 1024 1024 
 
Table 4.   Comparison of SHA parameters (After Ref. [23]) 
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c. Message Authentication Codes and HMAC 
The message authentication codes (MAC) technique is similar to a hash 
function in that it uses a secret key to generate an authentication code, which is appended 
to the original message. Upon message reception, the MAC is recalculated (both nodes 
again share the same secret key) and the two MACs are compared. If they match, the 




Figure 8.   Message authentication using MAC (From Ref. [23]) 
 
In FIPS PUB 113, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) recommends the use of Data Encryption Standard (DES) for the MAC 
calculation. There was an increased interest in the industry for developing a hash-based 
MAC because hash functions are readily available in the public domain (unlike 
conventional cryptographic algorithms, which are typically patented) and hash functions 
operate faster. The end result was RFC 2104, which defined HMAC (Hash-MAC) for 
secure Internet protocols. 
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4. Digital Signatures 
A digital signature is an encrypted message digest that is appended to a message. 
Digital signatures are based on a combination of public key encryption as well as secure 
hash function and confirm both the sender’s identity and the integrity of the message. 
They rely on public key cryptography in that they require the sender to own both a unique 
private and a public key.  The process of digitally signed messages includes the following 
steps: 
(1) The sender creates a private/public key pair. 
(2) The sender transmits the public key to the receiver. 
(3) The message is hashed and the message digest is produced. 
(4)  The message digest is encrypted with the sender’s private key. 
(5) The digital signature is the encrypted hash. A copy of the original message 
and the digital signature is transmitted to the receiver. 
In order to verify the signature, the receiver: 
(1) separates the message from the digital signature, 
(2) applies the sender’s public key to decrypt the message digest, 
(3) takes the original message and feeds it into the same hash function, and 
(4) compares the two outputs to see whether they match. 
Although digital signatures authenticate both the sending node identity and the 
integrity of the message, they do not provide data confidentiality. Separate confidentiality 
mechanisms can be applied in parallel to ensure both confidentiality and integrity.  
Digital signatures are susceptible to spoofing as can be seen by the following 
example. Consider an adversary who sends his public key to the receiver, pretending that 
this public key belongs to a legitimate sender. The adversary can now digitally sign 
messages with his private key and the receiver will assume that they originated from a 
trusted sender because the messages would decrypt correctly. Public key infrastructure 
(PKI) can be used to provide a solution to this problem.  
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PKI is based on a trusted third party, called the certificate authority (CA) who is 
responsible for creation and distribution of certificates. A certificate contains a user ID, 
the public key for that user, and the CA’s digital signature. PKI assumes that the CA is a 
trusted node and that its private keys are not subject to compromise. 
5. IPSec 
There exist a number of application-specific security mechanisms that provide 
confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity. IPSec was designed to be transparent to the 
application layer and is a collection of RFCs that provide mechanisms, protocols and 
message formats to achieve secure point-to-point confidentiality and integrity at the IP 
layer.    
a. IPSec Architecture 
IPSec offers a number of security services including access control, 
integrity, authentication, anti-replay, and confidentiality. When IPSec is applied in a 
point-to-point communication system, nodes on both ends of the communication link are 
required to agree on a pre-defined set of security parameters. In the following sections, 
the protocols, formats, and mechanisms used by IPSec are briefly explained. Table 5 
provides a summary of the IPSec framework’s services and underlying mechanisms. 
 
Services Mechanism  
Confidentiality Encryption, ESP Header, ESP Packet 
Originator authenticity 
Anti replay, Sequence number in ESP header Integrity 
Data integrity, Integrity check value (ICV) 
Authentication Authentication header (AH) 
Key management Internet key exchange (IKE) 
 





b. Authentication Header (AH) 
AH is used when only authentication and not confidentiality is required. It 
provides data authentication and integrity for IP packets between the two systems, but it 
does not encrypt the data packet. Authentication is achieved through the use of a HMAC. 
The two entities share a secret key, a message digest is produced, and the digest is 
appended as an AH header to the data. The receiver compares the digests to verify the 
integrity of the message. Because HMAC uses a symmetric key, the authenticity of the 
packet is guaranteed. AH supports various types of HMACs. Figure 9 shows the AH 
appended to an IP packet. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Authentication Header appended to an IP packet (AH) 
 
The Authentication data field holds the integrity check value (ICV), which 
is a truncated MAC code. It has a length of 96 bits and is calculated over the TCP header 
and upper layer data, the AH, and the fields of the IP Header that do not change during 
multi-hop transmission.  
c. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) 
ESP is used when encryption is needed. ESP can also provide optional 
authentication for the IP packet payload, and the ESP header. It provides confidentiality 
by encrypting mainly payload, and it supports several symmetric encryption algorithms, 
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such as DES, 3DES, and AES. When it is used with the authentication option, the 
encrypted IP datagram and the ESP header and trailer are included in the hashing process. 
A new IP header is appended in front of the packet for routing purposes. Figure 10 shows 




Figure 10.   Encapsulating security payload (ESP) format (From Ref. [23]) 
 
d. Modes of Operation 
Both AH and ESP can be applied to IP packets in two different modes: 
Transport and Tunnel mode. 
(1) Transport Mode. Transport mode is primarily used for end-
to-end transmissions between hosts. It protects the payload of the packet but leaves the 
original IP address unencrypted. The original IP header is used for routing purposes. 
Accordingly, transport mode provides security to the higher layer protocols only. 
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(2) Tunnel Mode. In this mode of operation, a new IP header is 
inserted after the original IP header. This mode protects both the payload and the old IP 
header.  
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate how transport and tunnel modes are 
implemented with both AH and ESP. 
 
IP Header Data
Authenticated except for mutual fields
IP Header AH Data
TRANSPORT MODE
Authenticated except for mutual fields in the new IP header








Figure 12.   ESP transport and tunnel mode  
 
e. Security Associations (SA) 
The concept of a security association (SA) is fundamental to the IPSec 
implementation. A SA is an agreement between two communicating entities on how the 
IPSec security services will be used. A SA includes the encryption and authentication 
algorithm as well as the session shared key. This key will be used in all the functions of 
the IPSec framework that require the use of such a key (e.g., the HMAC). Different SAs 
can be used for each communication direction to protect the traffic stream. Every SA is 
uniquely identified by a number called the security parameter index (SPI) and the 
destination IP. When a system wants to send a packet protected by IPSec, it chooses the 
desired SA, processes it accordingly, and inserts the proper SPI into the IPSec header. 
The receiver follows exactly the same procedure. 
f. Key Management 
IPSec supports both manual and automatic distribution of keys. Manual 
key management requires an administrator to manually configure each system with the 
keying material and the SA parameters and is not preferred in large implementations. 
Clearly, this option does not scale efficiently. The default automated key management 
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protocol selected for IPSec is the Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol (ISAKMP), sometimes referred to simply as Internet Key Exchange (IKE). 
ISAKMP defines procedures and packet formats for the SA and payloads during the key 
exchange and distribution. A more detailed description of ISAKMP can be found in RFC 
2408. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the topology and architecture of a hybrid, large-scale 
network for ballistic missile defense and identified an accompanying set of real-time data 
dissemination requirements and satellite link constraints. An overview of the IR and RF 
sensors was provided, with an emphasis on the QWIR IR sensors. Security issues 
regarding node and data authentication were addressed, and the important role of data 
confidentiality was highlighted. 
The chapter closed with an overview of the security primitives and protocols used 
in the proposed multistage authentication and confidentiality scheme that follows. 
Detailed descriptions can be found in the corresponding RFCs.    
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III. PROPOSED MULTISTAGE AUTHENTICATION AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY SCHEME 
This chapter describes a multistage security mechanism that provides node and 
data authentication as well as data confidentiality. A two-stage node authentication 
scheme ensures that only a node with legitimate credentials will join the network, 
participating in the target data exchange while the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant 
Authentication (TESLA) algorithm combined with strong encryption in the network layer 
guarantees that the data were not altered, that they originated from a trusted source, and 
that there were not comprised by an unauthorized adversary.  
The result is an efficient and effective multistage scheme that accommodates the 
requirements and constraints identified in Chapter II. To simplify the discussion, the 
notation in Table 6 is used to describe the cryptographic protocols and operations in this 
thesis. 
 
N Node requesting access to the network 
A 
Authenticator, a node that protects and 
controls access to the network verifying the 
credentials presented 
ID Node’s identification code 
K Encryption key shared or derived 
Enc(M,K) Encryption of message M using key K 
Dec(M,K) Decryption of message M using key K 
N-Pub, N-Pri Node’s public and private key pair  
A-Pub, A-Pri Authenticator’s public and private key pair  
H(M) Hashed output of message M.  
 
Table 6.   Notation used to describe the operation of the proposed multi-stage solution 
(From Ref. [9]) 
Additionally, the following assumptions are made: 
• The command and control node is considered to be a trusted source. 
• All the nodes within the network can communicate with the command and 
control node. (Note that this may be multi-hop). 
• Private keys are not compromised. 
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• Nodes are not constrained by processing or energy limitations; therefore, 
the encryption keys will be chosen with the maximum security criterion. 
A. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY 
In our proposed security scheme, the data confidentiality function is performed 
entirely by IPSec.  IPSec is applied at the IP layer and is not application specific. This 
provides flexibility and scalability and allows our scheme to support any future 
application properly configured for secure data dissemination. We propose ESP packets 
in the transport mode. ESP is preferred over AH because our primary objective is 
confidentiality rather than pure authentication. The transport mode is preferable to the 
tunnel mode because real-time data dissemination requires minimization of the 
authentication delay. In tunnel mode, additional delay would be added without significant 
gain.  
B. NODE AUTHENTICATION 
The two-stage node authentication scheme is comprised of a centralized phase 
followed by a distributed phase. 
1. Centralized Authentication 
Initially, a centralized approach is used in which the command and control node 
(acting as the central authenticator) grants or denies access based on credentials presented 








Request for authentication to 
authenticator
(1) Distribution of initializing 
key
(2) Distribution of certificate 
 
 
Figure 13.   Centralized node authentication  
 
The scheme is initiated when the joining node issues a request for authentication 
to the command and control node. The pseudocode of the algorithm is presented in 
Figure 14. A valid node ID is a significant piece of information for an adversary who 
may want to break into the network. It is, therefore, imperative that the node ID is not 
transmitted unencrypted. Additionally, the use of the digital signature in Step 1 ensures 
that the hashed output of the node ID is sent only by the supplicant node. The ID and the 






Figure 14.   Pseudocode of centralized authentication phase request 
 
The command and control node receives the authentication request and completes 
the algorithm outlined in Figure 15. The decrypted node ID is used to determine which 
public key pair should be applied for the decryption of the hashed ID value (it is 
encrypted with the node’s private key). The authenticator must maintain a table that 
associates node IDs to public keys. This table will include a full list of valid nodes for the 
given network. In the scenarios envisioned, these nodes could be land-based stations, 
warships, aircraft, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) or satellites. A predefined time 
schedule could be used to renew valid nodes’ IDs in the table. In addition to providing a 
mechanism to support dynamic updates, this can also be used to reassign node IDs in the 




Figure 15.   Pseudocode of centralized authentication phase response 
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The authenticator selects the appropriate public key and decrypts the hashed ID. 
At this point, the authenticator knows both the transmitted node ID and its transmitted 
hashed value. The authenticator then internally produces the correct hash of the provided 
ID and compares the two hashes. If they match, the node is authenticated successfully. 
The command and control node informs the other network nodes that a new node has 
been granted access by issuing a certificate, which includes the node’s current ID and its 
public key. This certificate is distributed to all active nodes and will be used during the 
distributed node authentication phase. The authenticator also distributes an initializing 
key to the new node which will be used to generate a set of keys for subsequent data 
authentication. 
2. Distributed Authentication 
In the distributed node authentication phase, the joining node is authenticated by 
the active network nodes. This phase is presented in Figure 16. To support routing 




Figure 16.   Distributed node authentication  
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All active nodes maintain a table of all other active nodes in the network. This 
table contains node IDs, corresponding public keys, and a flag indicating whether the 
indexed node has passed the distributed authentication procedure. Only distributively 
authenticated nodes can participate in a data exchange with this node. This table is 
updated when a certification is received and when a node completes the distributed part 
of the authentication procedure.  
All active nodes receive the certificate that the command and control node issued 
for the new node. The message exchange procedure outlined in the previous section is 
initiated and repeated for each neighbor node because the neighbor nodes are now aware 
of the new node’s ID and public key. Once the authentication procedure succeeds, the 
table at each neighbor node is updated and the new node is permitted to engage in data 
exchange. 
C. DATA AUTHENTICATION 
In our scheme, the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) 
protocol is chosen for data authentication because it provides low per-packet overhead, 
small authentication delay, and robustness in the face of packet loss. This protocol is 
described in detail in [15], but we provide an overview in the following paragraphs. 
TESLA assumes all the nodes are “loosely time synchronized.” By “loosely time 
synchronized,” we mean that the receiver should be aware of a maximum value for the 
synchronization error that is calculated during the setup phase.  
To send an authenticated packet, the sender computes a MAC for the packet with 
an undisclosed key. The key used for this MAC will be disclosed in future packets 
according to a predefined key disclosure schedule. When the receiving nodes get the 
packet, they can verify that the MAC key has not yet been revealed (they are loosely 
synchronized) and that the total delay (transmission and propagation) of the packet is 
within expected limits. If these conditions are met, the packet is buffered. After the key 
disclosure interval passes, the receiver receives the key used for the MAC for the 
buffered packet, and, if the key is correct, the packet’s authenticity is verified. 
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During the setup phase, the sender generates a set of keys utilizing a 
pseudorandom function. These keys will be used for the generation of the MAC keys and 
are generated using a key chain. This means that each generated key is used as an input 
for the generation of the next key of the chain  
 
 1 ( )+ =i iK H K . (3.1) 
 
The sender picks the last key in the sequence and uses it as an input to another 
hash function to produce the first MAC key for the first authenticated packet. Because H 
is a one-way function, any node can compute forward keys but not backward keys.  
At this point, the sender has generated two sequences of keys. The first key chain 
Ki…n is used in the reverse order for the generation of the second key sequence (i.e., the 
MAC keys). A logical implementation would associate the number of the keys produced 
with the number of the transmitted packets. To achieve faster transmission rates, the 
algorithm associates keys not directly to packets but to time intervals. The packets that 
are transmitted within a specific time interval are all authenticated with the same MAC 
key. 
Every packet transmitted contains the following: the data payload (the message), 
the hashed value of the key used to compute the MAC of the following packet, and the 
original key used for the MAC of the previous packets (how far back depends on the key 
disclosure time). In Figure 17, we assume that the receiver has received and authenticated 
packets P1 and P2 and it receives packet P3.  P3 contains both K1, and H(K3), as well as 
the data itself. The receiver has already received H(K1) from previous packets. It has also 
received K1 but has yet to verify that the key is valid. It calculates the digest of K1, and, if 
the two hashes match, the key is authentic and it can verify packets P1 and P2. It has 
already received H(K3), but it cannot authenticate P3 because it has not yet received K2. It 
buffers P3 and waits for the reception of the next group of packets. When P4 and P5 are 
received, the receiver performs the same procedure for the authenticity of P3 since P4 
contains K2. It calculates the digest of K2 and compares the hashes. The procedure 




Figure 17.   TESLA Authentication algorithm example  
 
The receiver utilizes a time-out mechanism to drop packets whose delay exceeds a 
pre-determined bound that is included to minimize the ability of an adversary to forge 
packets in the case of a compromised key disclosure schedule. As mentioned earlier, this 
protocol requires loose time synchronization between the sender and the receiver. 
Whenever a key is received, the following security condition has to be met: 
                      
 max_ _ max_
int
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥




where tmax_sync_err is the maximum synchronization error between the sender and the 
receiver, tmax_delay is the maximum one way network propagation delay and tint is the time 
interval defined by the sender. Larger values of d increase the authentication time 
because the receiver will have to buffer all the received packets until the appropriate 
authentication key is received. 
It is desirable to minimize d to improve the real-time dissemination performance. 
TESLA accommodates variable packet flow rates by determining d for each chain. 
Multiple chains allow the binding of links with different channel characteristics (e.g., 
propagation delay and transmission rate). 
In our scheme, the initializing key used to produce the key chain is distributed to 
the new node by the trusted command and control node during the centralized 
authentication phase as shown in Figure 13. As we shall see in Chapter IV, this parameter 
manages the trade-off between the level of security and the authentication delay. 
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D. SUMMARY 
The proposed multistage security mechanism for a hybrid, large-scale network for 
ballistic missile defense has been presented. The importance of a multistage node 
authentication was addressed, and an algorithm that meets this requirement was 
proposed. It is the based on public key infrastructure and digital signatures for node 
authentication. The TESLA algorithm, a proposed Internet standard, is the protocol of 
choice for the real-time data authentication. Among other features, it exhibits robustness 
in the face of packet losses and accommodates variable data rates. Data encryption is 
provided by IPSec. The choice of encryption at the IP layer provides the advantage of 
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION  
The performance analysis and simulation of the proposed multistage 
authentication and confidentiality scheme can be divided into two parts. The first part 
focuses on the authentication while the second part focuses on the confidentiality. The 
authentication analysis examines both the node and data authentication delay. The 
confidentiality results compare total delay associated with IPSec to that of unencrypted 
IP. 
A. NODE AND DATA AUTHENTICATION 
This section provides performance analysis as well as simulation results for both 
the node and the data authentication mechanisms. Data packets cannot be exchanged until 
the authentication procedure is completed. Total “security originated” delay affects the 
network’s data throughput, especially when data are broadcast to several nodes for 
routing and retransmission purposes.  
1. Node Authentication Delay  
The total node authentication delay, ttotal, can be derived by first examining the 
individual algorithms presented in Chapter III (see Figures 14 and 15) to determine the 
delays associated with the authentication request, treq, and the authentication response, tres. 
These can be shown to be  
 
  --  -  -= + + +req enc ID KID Hash enc Hash pri enc K pubt t t t t  (4.1) 
 
 _ _ _ _ _ ( )_ -= + + +res dec K pri dec ID K dec H ID pub ID Hasht t t t t  (4.2) 
 
where tID-Hash is the time required for the ID to be hashed, tenc Hash-pri is the time required 
to encrypt the hash with the private key, tenc ID-K  is the time required to encrypt the ID 
with the selected key K and tenc K-pub is the time required to encrypt the key with a public 
key. Similarly, tdec_K_pri, tdec_ID_K, tdec_H(ID)_pub and tID_Hash represent the time required for 
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the decryption process of the authenticator. These terms are summed and the total is 
doubled to include both the centralized and distributed authentication stages to arrive at 
 
 2 ( )= × +req restotalt t t . (4.3) 
 
2. Data Authentication 
In this section, we evaluate the TESLA key disclosure parameter, d, for a hybrid 
large-scale wireless sensor network. It is desirable to minimize d to improve the real-time 
dissemination performance of the mechanism. Overall performance analysis of the 
implementation of the TESLA algorithm can be found in [15]. TESLA accommodates 
variable packet flow rates by determining d for each chain. Multiple chains allow the 
binding of links with different channel characteristics (e.g., propagation delay and 
transmission rate). As given in (3.1), d is proportional to the maximum synchronization 
error between the sender and the receiver and the maximum network propagation delay. 
Larger values of d increase the authentication time because the receiver will have to 
buffer all the received packets until the appropriate authentication key is received. The 
parameter d must be chosen to be greater than the total transmission time for each link 
between the sender and the receiver. Otherwise, packets would be dropped as invalid and 
the performance of the algorithm would be degraded. Additionally, it can be seen that a 
reduction in the maximum synchronization error allows for a commensurate reduction in 
d. Assumed that a GPS time signal is used for synchronization among all nodes, then the 
time synchronization error will be on order of 100 ns [28]. 
3. Simulation Results 
In this section, the delay performance of our node authentication algorithm is 
evaluated on a 3.4 GHz Pentium IV Windows PC in Java using the library of 
cryptographic functions provided by the GNU Crypto project [6]. A C/C++ 
implementation may prove to be faster, but the results produced by the JAVA 
implementation provide a relative comparison of the performance of the algorithm. 
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At this point, we simulate a new node entering the network and both the proposed 
centralized and the distributed algorithms are applied. The Java cryptographic library is 
capable of measuring decryption and encryption times for several symmetric algorithms 
and hash functions. An example of the output of the Java execution code is shown in 
Figure 18. In this example, the input data was a 10-byte packet, and the program 
measured encryption and decryption times of several symmetric algorithms as well as the 
performance of different hash functions.  
Additional time required for the generation of the private and public keys for the 
new node is not included in the total authentication time since it is assumed that the 
command and control node (authenticator) has pre-computed several sets of keys for this 





Figure 18.   JAVA code execution demo  
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Figures 19 and 20 illustrate the performance of our proposed node authentication 
algorithm. For this simulation, we used several data lengths and the total authentication 
delay totalt . The individual request and response times, treq and tres, respectively, are 
plotted as a function of the data length. The performance of all the cryptographic 
mechanisms is directly related to the computational power of the source and the 
destination. Faster processors will achieve lower encryption and decryption delays. 
Nevertheless, the results are representative, and it can be seen that reasonable latency is 





Figure 19.   Node authentication delays (treq  and tres ) for (a) encryption and (b) 
decryption  
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Closely examining the terms in treq and tres , it is observed that the length of the 
key size in the RSA algorithm (used to encrypt/decrypt the hash of the ID and the random 
key) is the dominating factor in the total authentication delay of our algorithm. The low 
encryption and decryption performance of the asymmetric algorithms compared to the 
symmetric algorithms [23] increases the total authenticators delay. A RSA key length of 
1024 bits, a Blowfish key length of 448 bits and a 3DES key length of 158 bits were used 
in the simulation. All cryptographic processes are assumed to be executed sequentially. 
Parallel processing techniques could further improve the performance of the proposed 
algorithm. 
 
Figure 20.   Total node authentication delay (ttotal ) 
 
Although it can be seen that, in general, larger keys result in longer delays, the use 
of efficient algorithms, such as Blowfish, can produce dramatic improvements in 
encryption delay times. As anticipated, in all cases, the RSA algorithm key is seen to be 
the dominant factor. Further, the use of an algorithm with a large key size, such as 
Blowfish in our scenario, dramatically increases the decryption time because a public key 
decryption process is performed to reveal this key. The effect is more visible when it is 
combined with the choice of a hash function, such as SHA512, with a large output. 
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B. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY  
The data confidentiality mechanism ensures that the exchanged data can only be 
viewed and processed by legitimate users of the network. In our proposed solution, data 
confidentiality is accomplished using the IPSec protocol suite. In this section, an OPNET 
simulation is performed to examine IPSec performance in the context of a hybrid, large-
scale network for missile defense. 
1. OPNET Implementation  
We used the OPNET network simulator to simulate the hybrid, large-scale 
network. The network topology is depicted in Figure 21.  
 
 
Figure 21.   OPNET network topology 
 
Our simulated network consists of 8 nodes: two mobile terrestrial nodes, four 
satellites, and two fixed terrestrial nodes. These were comprised of four LEO satellites, 
one X-band radar, one war ship, and two ground stations exchanging target data. It is 
assumed that tracking has commenced; therefore, the GEO satellites are not modeled in 
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the simulator. It is envisioned that the GEO satellites will be used for initial viewing only 
due to the large propagation distances and the lack of on board tracking sensors. The 
eastern ground station simulated the Command and Control Center (Sink), which collects 
all the unprocessed target data. Each node is interconnected by a point-to-point link, 
configured to simulate a wireless channel. The OSPF protocol was used for routing. Node 
and channel configuration characteristics are shown in Table 7. 
 
Links BER: 10-4  Data Rate (R): 2 Mbps 
Mobile 
nodes 




Altitude: 1000 km,  Distance between LEOs: 2200 km 
 
Table 7.   OPNET simulation parameters 
 
In this simulation, we assume that target data are generated by Mobile Node 1 and 
the RF sensor (X-band radar). In the equivalent scenario, these two network nodes are 
tracking the incoming ballistic missile target and are sending target data to the command 
and control node for further processing. Data are sent at a rate proportional to the PRF 
value of the tracking radar. The total delay is measured at the sink (the command and 
control node).  
Traffic generators are properly configured to create IPSec packets. An IPSec 
process module has been installed and set to use ESP packet formats in transport mode. 
Each ESP packet uses HMAC-MD5-96 for authentication and AES in CBC mode (128 
bits each block) with a key size of 128 bits for encryption. The average authentication 
and encryption times of the algorithms are calculated and inserted as processing delays in 
the IPSec process model.  
2. Simulation Results 
Figure 22 plots the total average delay for IP and IPSec as a function of PRF. 
From the plot, the latency associated with IPSec can be clearly seen. The increase in 



























Figure 22.   Average delay versus PRF 
 
The delay presented in this graph is produced by 8 nodes. We expect an increase 
of the total delay when larger geographical areas are covered, or when the number of the 
participating nodes is increased.    
Figure 23 presents a comparison of the throughput at the receiver node (Sink) for 
both IP and IPSec scenarios as a function of PRF.  The decrease in throughput for IPSec 
is due to the overhead that IPSec introduces. An ESP packet adds an overhead of almost 
32-36 bytes for each IP packet (as shown in Figure 10). The overall throughput could be 













































Figure 23.   Throughput versus PRF 
 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided performance analysis and simulation of the proposed 
security scheme for authentication and confidentiality. Using the GNU Java 
cryptographic library, encryption and decryption times for the multistage node 
authentication scenario were calculated. The associated total delay proved to be 
reasonable and will be further improved because the processing capabilities of the actual 
nodes exceed those of the lab PC used for the simulation. Larger key lengths were seen to 
improve security with the trade-off of longer delays. An OPNET simulation was 
developed to measure the total delay when IPSec is implemented. It was shown that the 
additional delay of the IPSec implementation was reasonable when compared to the 
overall latency of the IP. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis proposed multistage security mechanism for a hybrid, large-scale 
wireless sensor network designed to support the integrated ballistic missile defense 
system. This scheme combines node and data authentication mechanisms to provide 
robust security coupled with real-time data dissemination and utilizes data encryption to 
ensure data confidentiality. Performance and simulation analysis demonstrated that the 
delay and throughput of the proposed system commensurate with unencrypted IP. 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis accomplished two objectives. Firstly, a robust, real-time secure 
authentication mechanism was proposed. Node authentication was provided in two stages 
using RSA with the result that the new node obtained authentication credentials from two 
separate authenticators. The algorithm makes use of digital signatures and certificates to 
ensure that only legitimate nodes will enter the network. Data authentication and 
confidentiality were accomplished through the implementation of the TESLA algorithm 
and the IPSec set of protocols, respectively. TESLA exhibited packet loss tolerance and 
provided secure data authentication. It can accommodate multiple data rates 
interconnecting various types of links. IPSec encrypts transmitted data, protecting the 
valuable content from unauthorized viewing. In our solution, it is applied at the IP layer 
and is application transparent.  
Secondly, performance analysis and simulation were performed to verify that the 
overhead introduced by the security mechanism did not substantially impact network 
throughput and delay. The RSA algorithm key length is an essential design and 
implementation parameter for our proposed algorithm since it dominates the delay 
performance of the node authentication mechanism. The trade-off between increased 




B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This thesis proposed a real-time multistage security mechanism to support the 
hybrid, large-scale wireless sensor networks for missile defense. It combined node 
authentication based on digital signatures and the public key infrastructure (PKI) and data 
authentication using the time efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA) 
protocol. The proposed mechanism also utilizes data encryption (IPSec) to provide data 
confidentiality. 
The analysis of the disclosing parameter d of the TESLA algorithm was 
performed only based on link characteristics. Only a lower bound was evaluated, without 
any further investigation. Additionally, the performance of the security mechanism was 
demonstrated using sequential processing of the associated cryptographic functions. 
Moreover, the proposed mechanism addressed only authentication and confidentiality 
issues.    
Future work should include a complete implementation and subsequently fielding 
of the security mechanism proposed. As part of this follow-on work, the analysis of 
disclosing parameter d of the TESLA algorithm should be expanded. Additional 
improvements to the performance of the security mechanism, including parallel 
processing and data aggregation within the AOI, may be investigated. A complete 
security solution would also address other security challenges, such as defending against 
denial of service (DoS) and other types of attacks, detecting misbehaving or rogue nodes, 
preventing traffic analysis, and optimizing key management techniques. 
  
 57
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. A. Roy-Chowdhury, J.S. Baras, M. Hadjitheodosiou, S. Papademetriou, “Security 
Issues In Hybrid Networks With a Satellite Component,” IEEE Wireless 
Communications, December 2005, Volume 12,  Issue 6,  December 2005, pp. 50 
– 61. 
2. J. Border, M. Kojo, J. Griner, G. Montenegro, Z. Shelby, “Performance 
Enhancing Proxies Intended to Mitigate Link-Related Degradations,” RFC 3135, 
June 2001. 
3. E.L. Dereniak, G.D. Boreman, “Infrared Detectors and Systems,” Wiley, 1996. 
4. W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New Directions in Cryptography,” IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. IT-22, November 1976, pp. 644-654. 
5. D. Demirel, F. Alagoz, M. U. Qaglayan, “IPSEC over Satellite Links: A New 
Flow Identification Method,” International Symposium on Computer Networks 
2006, pp. 140 – 146, June 2006. 
6. The GNU Crypto Project – Free Software Foundation, 
http://www.gnu.org/software/gnu-crypto/, February 2007. 
7. S. D. Gunapala and S. V. Bandara, “Quantum Well Infrared Photo-detector 
(QWIP) Focal Plane Arrays,” Center for Space Microelectronics Technology, Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, published in 
“Semiconductors and Semimetals” series, Vol. 62, 1999. 
8. P. Katopodis, Gr. Katsis, O. Walker, M. Tummala, J. B. Michael, “Hybrid large 
scale wireless sensor network for missile defense,” In Proc. IEEE International 
Conference of SoSE, San Antonio, TX, April 2007. 
9. Gr. Katsis, P. Katopodis, T.O. Walker III, M. Tummala, J. B. Michael, 
“Multistage authentication for hybrid large scale mobile wireless sensor networks 
for missile defense,” Submitted for publication in the 18th Annual IEEE 
International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications 
(PIMRC'07), Athens Greece, September 2007. 
10. N. Koblitz, “Elliptic curve cryptosystems,” in Mathematics of Computation 48, 
1987, pp. 203–209. 
11. J. Kong, “Providing Robust and Ubiquitous Security Support for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks,” In Proc. 9th Int’l Conf. Network Protocols (ICNP’01), 2001, pp. 579-
89. 
 58
12. M. Luk, A. Perrig and B. Whillock, “Seven cardinal properties of sensor network 
broadcast authentication,” In Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Workshop on 
Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks SASN '06, 2006, pp. 147-156.  
13. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), “Ballistic Missile Defense System Overview 
(BDMS),” 15 March 2005. 
14. Quantum Well Infrared Photodetector (QWIP) Home Page, Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, http://qwip.jpl.nasa.gov/, April 2007. 
15. A. Perrig, R. Canetti, J. D. Tygar and S. Dawn, “Efficient authentication and 
signing of multicast streams over lossy channels,” In Proceedings of the 2000 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2000, pp. 56-73. 
16. A. Perrig, “The BiBa one-time signature and broadcast authentication protocol,” 
In Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security (CSS-8), Philadelphia, PA, November 2001, pp. 28-37. 
17. A. Perrig, R. Canetti, D. Tygar and D. Song, “The TESLA Broadcast 
Authentication Protocol,” CryptoBytes, vol. 5, Summer 2002. 
18. A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J. D. Tygar, V. Wen and D. E. Culler, “SPINS: Security 
Protocols for Sensor Networks,” Wireless Networks, vol. 8, p. 521, September 
2002. 
19. L. Reyzin, N. Reyzin, “Better than BiBa: Short onetime signatures with fast 
signing and verifying,” In Seventh Australasian Conference on Information 
Security and Privacy (ACISP 2002), July 2002. 
20. R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining digital 
signatures and public-key cryptosystems,” Commun ACM, vol. 21, pp. 120-126, 
1978. 
21. K. Sankar, S. Sundaralingam, A. Balinsky and D. Miller, “Cisco wireless LAN 
security,” Scitech Book News, vol. 30, pp. 13-34, September 2006. 
22. S. Chang, S. Shieh, W. W. Lin, C. Hsieh, “An Efficient Broadcast Authentication 
Scheme in Wireless Sensor Networks,” In Proceedings of the 2006 ACM 
Symposium on Information, computer and communications security ASIACCS '06, 
March 2006. 
23. W. Stallings, “Cryptography and Network Security,” Fourth ed., Prentice Hall, 
November 2005. 
24. M.Z. Tidrow, W.R. Dyer, “Infrared Sensors for ballistic missile defense,” 
(Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Pentagon Washington, D.C.), Infrared 
Science & Technology, published by Elsevier Science B.V., 2001. 
 59
25. M.Z. Tidrow, “New infrared sensors for ballistic missile defense,”(Missile 
Defense Agency/Advanced Systems, Pentagon Washington DC), Quantum 
Sensing and Nanophotonic Devices II, In Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 5732, 
Bellingham, WA, 2005. 
26. I.R. Thompson, A.O. Waller, G. Jones, “Performance Enhancing Proxies and 
Security,” IEEE Seminar on IP over Satellite, The Next Generation: MPLS, VPN 
and DRM Delivered Services, 2003, pp. 1- 14. 
27. K. Uzun, Master’s thesis, “Requirements and limitations of boost-phase ballistic 
missiles intercept systems,” Naval Postgraduate School, September 2004. 
28. T.O. Walker III; M. Tummala, J.B. Michael, “Pulse transmission scheduling for a 
distributed system of cooperative radars,” 2006 IEEE/SMC International 
Conference on System of Systems Engineering, Los Angeles, 24-26 April 2006, 6 
pp. 
29. D.A. Wilkening, “Airborne Boost-Phase Ballistic Missile Defense,” Science and 
Global Security, Taylor & Francis, Vol. 12, pp. 1-67, 2004. 
30. P. Woodward, T. Pell, G. Hernandez, “Performance enhancing proxies - are they 
as beneficial as they seem,” IEEE Seminar on IP over Satellite, The Next 
Generation: MPLS, VPN and DRM Delivered Services, 2003, pp. 22-26. 
31. S. Yi, R. Kravets, “Key Management for Heterogeneous Ad Hoc Wireless 
Networks,” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2002. 
32. S. Yi, R. Kravets, “MOCA: Mobile Certificate Authority for Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks,” Report No. UIUCDCS-R-2004-2502, UILU-ENG-2004-1805, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2002. 
33. Z, Wang; Q. Guo; X. Gu, “Comprehensive Computational Analysis on TCP in 
Satellite Links,” Innovative Computing Information and Control 2006, ICICIC06, 
Volume 1, 30-01, pp. 716 – 721, August 2006. 
34. L. Zhu, Z.J. Haas, “Securing Ad Hoc Networks,” IEEE Network Mag., vol. 13, 
no. 6, November/December 1999, pp. 24-30. 
 
 60
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 61
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3.  Professor Jeffrey B. Knorr 
Chairman, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4.  Professor James H. Luscombe 
Chairman, Department of Physics 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5.  Professor Murali Tummala  
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Associate Professor Gamani Karunasiri 
Department of Physics 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7.  Professor J. Bret Michael 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
8. CDR Owens Walker USN 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
9. Ms. Deborah Stiltner  
 Missile Defense National Team 




10. Hellenic Navy, General Staff 
Athens, Greece 
 
11. LT Grigorios Katsis 
 Department of Physics 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
